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Economic development is the result of hard work, discipline and frugality – qualities, 
which can be learned through an education process.  This is the gist of Max Weber's 
writings on the development of capitalism, which I have modeled in this paper. The 
model shows how an educational sector that produces a composite of work ethics and 
skills can lead to sustained growth. Human capital in this model reduces the disutility of 
effort exertion and thereby induces people to work harder. Along balanced growth path, 
effort exertion is constant in this mode. The model shows that growth is an increasing 
function of effort exertion which itself is a function of a number of efficiency 
parameters. Historical anecdotal evidence and a regression analysis looking at the 
effects of formal education on growth with a new interpretation are presented in support 
of the model.  
 
                                                 
• This paper was in part written while I was a Research Fellow at the International 
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1.  Introduction 
  Education and the accumulation of human capital is acknowledged by many 
growth models as the force that drives economic growth. Romer (1986, 1987, and 1991) 
introduced growth models with endogenous technological change where the 
accumulation of knowledge is the main engine of growth.  Lucas (1988, 1990) argues 
that the accumulation of human capital (defined as the general skill level) through 
schooling increases the marginal productivity of labor, which results in a sustained 
growth rate.  
  But historical evidence is not fully consistent with the skill/knowledge 
explanation of growth. Landes remarks (1969:61), "If anything, the growth of scientific 
knowledge owed much to the concerns and achievements of technology; there was far 
less flow of ideas or methods the other way".  Schmookler (1966) analyzed nearly 1,000 
major inventions in four industries (farming, railroading, petroleum refining and paper-
making) around the world between 1800 and 1957.  The four industries represent both 
old (agriculture and paper) and the new industries; some relying substantially on science 
(petroleum and paper) and some not so much.  Schmookler does not find a single 
invention where the stimulus was a scientific discovery.  
  Instead, Clark (1987) presents evidence that most of the growth in the 
agricultural productivity of the United States and Britain before 1850 was derived from 
the intensification of labor.  In a cross country study of the textile industry between the 
late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Clark (1987, 1991) shows evidence of a 
strong correlation between (i) labor productivity and work intensity in the textile 
industry, and (ii) the growth in GDP per capita and the progress of labor productivity in 
the textiles, meaning that the success of labor intensification in the textile industry 




  Most growth models, however, neglect the phenomenon of work intensity.  They 
typically assume that individuals’ supply of labor is inelastic.
1  This paper proposes a 
growth model consistent with the observation that growth, at least in its early stages, 
increases with work intensity and progress in work related values.  The proposed model 
here departs from the existing models in the literature by assuming that the individuals 
consumption-leisure preferences change through the accumulation of a certain type of 
human capital i.e., work ethics. It is assumed that the marginal disutility of labor is a 
decreasing function of work ethics.  Work ethic is defined as set of work related values 
that can be learned and though an educational process. The endowment of human 
capital determines the level at which individuals are willing to exert labor and the 
efficiency of labor in the production process.  These propositions are consistent with 
Max Weber's view of economic development. And the models proposed here are in the 
spirit of his writings. 
 
2. Traditionalism versus Modern Capitalism 
  The main thrust of the paper rests on the idea that the emergence of modern 
economy (e.g. sustained growth) presupposes a new set of motivation and a new system 
of ethics. This idea was best presented by Max Weber first. He begins with the 
observation that productivity gains in capitalism start with the intensification of labor. 
Without a change in attitudes, the backward bending labor supply curve limits the scope 
of labor intensification through pecuniary means.    
  
    “A man does not by nature wish to earn more and more money, 
but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much 
as is necessary for the purpose. Whenever modern capitalism has 
begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labor by 
increasing its intensity, it has encountered the immensely 
                                                 
    
1 Lucas (1990) is a notable exception where leisure is considered as a choice variable in his 




stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalism 
labor.”
2,
3                              
 
Weber cites examples of the type of backward traditional forms of labor of his 
contemporaries and the extent to which those forms frustrate employers. 
  
    An almost universal complaint of employers of girls, for instance, 
German girls, is that they are almost entirely unable and 
unwilling to give up methods of work inherited or once learned, 
in favor of more efficient ones, to adapt themselves to new 
methods to learn to concentrate their intelligence, or even to use 
it at all. Explanations of the possibility of making work easier, 
above all more profitable to themselves, generally encounter a 
complete lack of understanding.  Increases of piece-rates are 
without avail against the stone wall of habit.
4,5  
                 
Thus it is not only the quantity of labor that matters, but also a 'developed sense of 
responsibility is absolutely indispensable' for the development of capitalism.  Weber 
emphasizes that the ability of mental concentration, feeling of obligation to one's job a 
cool self-control and frugality enormously increases performance.  Labor must be 
performed as if it were an absolute end in itself.  The advent of modern capitalism is 
marked not only by the presence of willing workers but also by the presence of restless 
entrepreneurs who made the pursuit of riches the ultimate goal of their lives.  
 
    Man is dominated by the making of money by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of life . . . The making of money within the 
modern economic order is, so long as it is done legally, the result 
and the expression of virtue and proficiency in a calling. It is an 
obligation which the individual is supposed to feel toward the 
content of his professional activity . . . Such a state of mind in 
                                                 
2 Max Weber (1905/1956),  pp. 60. 
3 Adam Smith was also aware of these facts but he tends to attribute traditionalism to the lack of 
private property and security since "A person who can acquire no property, can have no other 
interest but to eat as much, and to labor as little as possible" Adam Smith (1776/1987), pp. 39). 
4  Max Weber (1905/1956) pp. 62. 
5  A similar concern is expressed by Moser, an American visitor to India in the 1920's.  He reports 
on the refusal of Indian workers to tend as many machines as they could and writes "It was 
apparent that they could easily have taken care of more, but they won't . . ., they cannot be 
persuaded by any exhortation, ambition, or the opportunity to increase their earnings." (Moser 




ancient times and in the Middle Ages would have been 
proscribed as the lowest sort of avarice and as an attitude entirely 
lacking in self respect. [Italics added.] 
If such behaviors are irrational and contrary to human nature, then how did they 
develop?  By education, Weber responds. 
 
    Such an attitude is by no means a product of nature.  It 
cannot be evoked by low wages or high ones alone, but 
can only be the product of a long and arduous process of 
education.
6 
        
Thus, according to this view the main function of the education system in capitalism is 
to shape a set of values, and to form habits useful for the maintenance and growth of 
capitalism.  Here, the success of the educational system is measured with not only what 
students know in the way of science and mathematics, but also how well they are 
motivated to do hard work, and to take initiative and responsibility. 
  Weber gives an account of the development of intrinsic work ethics in the 17th 
and 18th century Europe that had to do with the religious glorification of hard work, and 
'the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all 
spontaneous enjoyment of life,'- an idea that appears 'entirely irrational' from the 
standpoint of personal happiness or utility.  
  Theodore Veblen (1899/1934) on the other hand offers a secular explanation of 
work ethics (primarily extrinsic work ethics) based on peoples’ psychological 
propensities.  Veblen argues that people above the line of bare subsistence, do not use 
surplus to expand their lives, to live more wisely, intelligently, and understandingly.  
Instead, they use it to impress other people with the fact that they have a surplus.   
Veblen explains the basis for such impulse as the following: 
   
   
    Man in his own apprehension is a center of unfolding 
impulsive activity - "teleological activity".  He is an agent 
seeking in every act the accomplishment of some 
                                                 




concrete, objective, impersonal end.  By force of his 
being such an agent he is possessed of a taste for effective 
work, and a distaste for futile effort... This aptitude or 
propensity may be called the instinct of workmanship. 
Whenever the circumstances or traditions of life lead to an 
habitual comparison of one person with another in point 
of efficiency, the instinct of workmanship works out in an 
emulative or invidious comparison of persons . . . In any 
community where such an invidious comparison of 
persons is habitually made, visible success becomes an 
end, sought for its own utility as a basis of esteem.  
Esteem is gained and disgrace is avoided by putting one's 
efficiency in evidence.  The result is that the instinct of 
workmanship works out in an emulative demonstration of 
force.
7    [Italic added.] 
      
Thus, according to this view, work ethic is rational in the sense that it is based on the 
psychological propensities of men and its pursuit leads to personal satisfaction.   
  Interestingly enough Adam Smith’s views on human motivations in economic 
activity, contrary to the popular perception, are not essentially different from that of 
Veblen or Weber. In his Theory of Moral Sentiment Adam Smith argues that human 
beings by nature are predisposed to form hierarchical and cohesive structures. This is 
often expressed in the form of willingness to submit to norms of propriety and in status 
seeking. It is status that is “the end of half of the labor of human life”.  Thus this is the 
source of human motivation to deserve, to acquire and to enjoy the respect and 
admiration of the others (or at least half of it if not all). But how one can get this 
respect? “Two different roads led to the attainment of this so much desired objective;” 
Smith responds, “the one by study of wisdom and practice of virtue; the other by 
acquisition of wealth and greatness”.  Then when Smith says “ little else is requisite to 
carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, 
easy taxes and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by 
                                                 





the natural course of things” his presumption is that wealth is viewed as a vehicle to 
achieve status, respect, and greatness in the society
8.  
  A “diligent pursuit of proficiency” and wealth, however, is not the only possible 
channel for personal emulation.  History of mankind is full of examples of ways and 
means by which people have chosen to gain social status without resorting to productive 
activities. Conspicuous consumption and leisurely activities are two examples of other 
emulation channels that historically have been chosen.  
  Hayek (1973) suggests that a societal process of coordination and an 
improvement of individual quest for status will naturally (e.g. by the elimination of the 
unfit) lead to the adoption of the most socially efficient games - the ones that minimize 
the social cost of status seeking and maximize potential positive externalities. This may 
explain the prevalence of modern capitalism once it appeared in England first, however 
it does not preclude the necessity of the development of certain standards of ethics and 
accepted norms of behavior in the society prior and parallel to the development of 
capitalism itself.   
   Critics of Weber argue that first, there is nothing peculiar about the teachings of 
Calvin and early Puritans and whatever differences are observed in them in the late 17th 
and 18th century did not exist in the 16th century, and second these presumable 
differences could have not developed in a vacuum.
9  Protestant Ethic itself is the result 
of the development of capitalism. However, the issue of whether or not the spirit of 
capitalism preceded capitalism is not essential to the main point of this paper.  Even if 
economic conditions preceded the advent of work ethics and even if one believes that 
the creation of work ethics were motivated by capitalistic interests and that intellectual, 
                                                 
8 More recently Akerlof and Krenton (2003) consider non-pecuniary sources of work incentives. 
They and argue that workers’ self-image as jobholders, coupled with their ideal as how their job 
should be done, can be a major work incentive. In a theoretical model they show how 
identification with the firm, or with the job, or with the work groups can flatten reward 
schedules as they solve the “principal-agent” problem. 
9 For more argument on this issue see Robinson H. M., Aspects of the Rise of Economic 





religious, legal and social forces were in fact utilized by capitalism to serve its interest, 
one still can not escape the fact that these changes were instrumental for the further 
development of capitalism. This point is particularly relevant for less developed 
countries.  
  In this paper I adhere to a weaker Weberian proposition that (i) work ethic and 
hard work are necessary conditions for the development of capitalism, and (ii) work 
ethic can be created by a deliberate design of an education system including that of 
formal schooling.  
 
3.  A Weberian Growth Model 
  This Section illustrates how long term growth can be achieved via an 
educational sector that teaches principals of work ethic. Here human capital is defined 
as the extent to which the principal of agility, responsibility, punctuality, self-discipline 
and proficiency are internalized and practiced by in workers.  A worker endowed with 
such ethics strives for proficiency for its own sake as well as a source of income. Thus 
human capital is taken to represent both ethical and cognitive skills.
10  
  Consider a closed economy populated with N identical, infinitely-lived 
individuals with preferences over goods, effort exertion and human capital, represented 
by 
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10  Motivation for proficiency, of course, is not the same thing as the proficiency itself.  However 
I make this leap on the grounds that in the education process people acquire both willingness to 
learn and cognitive skills. Here I assume that the time spent on this activity is subsumed under 
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Here n is the population growth rate, ρ is the discount rate, ht is human capital, et is 
work effort, and ct is consumption at time t, all in per capita terms.  The utility function 
is assumed to be increasing in ct and ht, and decreasing in et.  The inclusion of human 
capital, in the utility function is justified on the grounds that (i) the fulfillment of ethical 
duties is a source of gratification, and (ii) knowledge of codes of impropriety can lead to 
self-gravitation and self-respect and also to status and respect of fellow man.  
  The utility function is assumed to be quasi-concave with the second and cross 
derivatives as stated in (1).  In particular, it is assumed that the marginal disutility of 
effort decreases with the accumulation of human capital (i.e., U23>0).  As we shall see, 
the latter assumption plays a crucial role in modeling Weberian hypothesis.  Marginal 
utility of consumption is assumed to increase with human capital. This is consistent 
with Smith, Weber and Veblen thought that consumption can be viewed an expression 
of status, proficiency, workmanship or even virtue. Increasing marginal utility of 
consumption is also consistent with Becker (1965) in which consumption and human 
capital are viewed as complements.  Labor supply in terms of hours of work per unit of 
time is assumed to be fixed (at one) for each individual, level of effort exertion 
however, is unbounded.  





φ >De, 0<φ<1, 0<α<1, and 0<σ
11.  a(h) can be viewed as a taste parameter which, for a 
given endowment of human capital, determines the degree to which workers dislike 
                                                 




effort exertion.  However, tastes and perceptions about work can change through an 
education process. The expression h
φ can be interpreted as the maximum level of effort 
potentials perceived by a typical worker, where the perception itself is a function of 
human capital endowment of the individuals in the society. Consistent with the 
Weberian view of capitalistic development and observations made by Clark (1987), this 
interpretation suggests a maximum level of effort exertion beyond which workers can 
not be persuaded to work harder by any means.   
            Utility  increases  with  education because education defines what is dignified, 
honorable, and respectful. Educated people view themselves as respectful individuals 
and are viewed as such in eyes of their peers, not so much because of having the 
education per se but because of behaving in a certain way. That certain way has to do 
with attitude toward work, its intensity and quality. But acquisition of propriety comes 
at a price which is harder work. If the function of the educational system was limited to 
make people work harder and feel good about it too, growth would be limited to the 
extend work effort could be increased, which is limited. But the focus of Weberian 
education is not only of quantity of work but also with its quality.  Some of this quality 
has to do with cognitive skills and some have to do with work manners such as 
punctuality, reliability, discipline, self-initiation and so forth.  
  There are two sectors in this economy producing a final good and education. A 
fraction, ut, of the available capital stock kt, and a fraction, vt, of effective labor etht are 
employed in production of final goods according to a constant return to scale production 
function F(vtkt, utetht). The remaining physical capital and effective labor are used in the 
production of human capital according to G[(1-vt)kt,(1-ut)eh]. The production functions 
F and G are assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments, 
strictly concave and homogenous of degree one. 
                                                                                                                                               
U33=WV22<0 necessary for utility function to be quasi concave.  Similarly, the restriction 0<α<1 
guarantees the conditions of U22=WV11<0 and U12=U21=W1V1>0.  Under these restrictions it 
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  Production of the final good is divided among consumption c, and investment 
k &(from here on the time subscript t will be suppressed): 
 
  k & = F(vk,ueh)- c – nk       (2) 
 
Accumulation of human capital per head is given by: 
 
  h & = G[(1-v)k,(1-u)eh] - nh  (3) 
 
The optimal allocation of resources in this economy is achieved by choosing quantities 
v, u, c, e, k, and h. From maximization of (1) subject to (2) and (3) it follows that value 
of marginal product of capital (and also that of effective labor) are equal in both sectors. 
That is, F1= pG1, (and F2= pG2), where p is the relative price of education in terms of 
consumption goods (i.e., λ2/λ1).  
  I assume that the ratio of physical capital per worker to effective labor k/eh, is 
constant in the balanced growth path. I also assume that the fraction of effective labor 
and of capital devoted to the production process in each sector (u and v), are constant in 
the balanced growth path of the economy.  That is: 
 
 
  Constancy of k/eh also implies that the shadow price of human capital in terms 
of final goods p is constant in the balanced growth path. Constancy of k/eh also 
guarantees the constancy of marginal products. It follows that in the balanced growth 
path the optimal level of effort exertion e is given by: 
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From this equation it is clear that on the balanced growth path effort exertion is 
constant. 
  To get a more concrete result we assume F(vk,ueh) is given by A(vk)
ß(ueh)
1-ß 
and G[(1-v)k,(1-u)e] is given by B[(1-v)k]
γ[(1-u)eh]
1-γ.  Divide both sides of (3) by h, 
substitute (1-v)/(1-
 γ)G2 eh for G and substitute for e from (4) then we have: 
 
       (5) 
The growth rate of physical capital is also a decreasing function of human capital since 
it is the sum of two falling growth rates: 
 
 
  Now let's turn to the determination of the growth rate of consumption.  The 
consumption growth rate takes the following form: 
 
 
  (6) 
  
where ψ(h) approaches zero as h grows large.  Equation (6) indicates that the growth 
rate of consumption, while falling along its balanced growth path in the limit, 
approaches a constant that is equal to the gap between net marginal product of capital 
and the consumer discount rate. 
  Now, let’s characterize the asymptotic behavior of the model.  In the balanced 
growth path with constant effort exertion, the growth rates of the two types of capital 
are equal to g: 
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Growth rate of consumption is also a constant given by:  
  (8) 
 
In (5), replace F2 by pG2, substitute for values of F1 and G2, and solve for eh/k: 
 
  (9) 
 
Solving for (1-v)/(1-u) from the efficiency condition F2/F1 = G2/G1 and substituting in 
the above equation and rearrange terms we obtain: 
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And hence growth rate of the economy is:  
() [] [] ρ φ
σ
ε ε ε
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- 1 + Γ 1   (11) 
Where 0<Γ<1 and 0<ε<1. From (7) and (8) solve for F1 and then using (11) solve for 
the optimal level of effort exertion. 
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Note that when in the production of human capital physical capital is not employed that 
is when γ = 0 then ε =1and Γ = 1, and hence:  ( ) B   e    =    F1 φ + Γ 1 
            From (11) it is clear that marginal productivity of capital, hence the growth rate 
of the economy grows with the level of effort exertion. Given a certain level of effort 
exertion, growth increases with production efficiency parameters A, B and the utility 




reduction of disutility of effort), the higher the optimal level of effort exertion in the 
balanced growth path. The higher the share of effort allocated to the production of 
human capital,(1-u), the higher the effort exertion.  An increase in discount rate reduces 
the growth and increases the optimal level of effort exertion. An increase in σ has a 
similar effect. That is an increase elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption 
1/σ increase the growth rate and reduces the level of optimal effort exertion (for 
plausible values of other parameters such as discount rate, and population growth rate).   
 
5.  Education and Growth 
In the growth model of the previous section I identified two mechanisms by which 
education can lead to economic growth.  One is related to increasing work intensity (in 
the LDC’s and sustaining its high level in the DC’s) and the other, has to do with 
increasing the productivity of each unit of effort. Both of these two tasks can be 
achieved via an educational system. However for the first one an educational system is 
required that targets individuals’ value system and for the second an educational system 
that targets cognitive/skill abilities.  
  As our Weberian model illustrated the presence of these mechanisms, i.e. ethical 
and cognitive education, are both necessary for obtaining a non-diminishing growth.  In 
addition, these models imply that in the early stages of economic development ethical 
skills ascertain higher growth potentials than cognitive skills.  As work intensities rise 
with the general level of economic development, the growth related function of work 
ethics becomes limited, while that of cognitive skills keeps on rising. 
  The direct test of these hypotheses requires data on work intensity, work ethics 
and cognitive skills of individuals at the national level, none of which are available.  
The lack of data on work intensity does not pose a serious problem.  Effort exertion is 
fixed in the DC's.  In the LDC's where work intensity rises with work ethics, we can use 




sectors which produce ethics and skills in any measurable way.  Formal schooling in the 
literature is typically used as a measure of skills in the labor force and we can do the 
same here.  But what about the ethical skills?   
  Ethical teachings and the formation of one's value system, clearly, it starts at 
home and then continues during one's life.  The parental ethical teachings have perhaps 
the most profound and long lasting effect.  These values are in turn reinforced or 
reshaped by various social institutions.  One of these institutions is formal schooling.  
We have no measure of the share of ethical values that are shaped at home.  In any case, 
such data wouldn't be very helpful since family education is not the subject of policy 
control.  We need to identify an institution, which first, has an impact on the ethical 
learning of individuals at the margin and second has measurable outputs. Formal 
schooling seems to be a good choice for such an institution.  A number of scholars have 
argued that formal schooling in a capitalist system is designed to shape habits and 
attitudes that are useful in the work environment.  Bowles and Gintis (1976), in 
particular, argue that the primary emphasis of the elementary and secondary education 
is on the development of attitudes best suited for the work environment while the 
emphasis in the higher education is more on the development of cognitive skills. 
  In my empirical investigation I use time series data on 30 countries to analyze 
the relationship between national income and stocks of physical and human capital.  I 
will use the number of students enrolled in elementary, secondary and higher education 
as a proxy for both ethical and cognitive skills in the labor force.   
  The empirical study presented here is not fundamentally different from the 
human capital studies that take school enrollment as a proxy for the skill level in the 
labor force.  The main difference lies in the interpretation of the results.  The evidence 
of positive association between education and income in these studies could be taken as 
evidence in support of the Weberian models developed here.  To demonstrate this 




do in fact lead to the development of ethical skills in addition to the cognitive ones, 
flowed by my own empirical findings. 
 
5.1   The Behavior Shaping Function of Formal Education  
In their educational classic Schooling in Capitalist America (1976) Bowles and Gintis 
argued that economic value of education has been grossly misunderstood by orthodox 
economics of education. The widely observed association between personal earnings 
and schooling is often attributed to the influence of education on the levels of cognitive 
knowledge in the working population.  But effective performance in most jobs, argued 
Bowles-Gintis, depends very little on directly usable cognitive skills and much more on 
certain non-cognitive personality traits. Schools are like mini-factories that produce the 
same behavioral traits and values that are prized in the labor market.  For example, 
factories are organized hierarchically, and so are schools; and obedience is require in 
factories, and so do schools.  The relationship between dominance and subordinancy in 
education differs by level.  The rule orientation of high school, Bowles and Gintis 
argued, reflects the close supervision of low-level workers; the internalization of norms 
and freedom from continual supervision in colleges reflect the social relationships of 
white-collar technical, supervisory and managerial work.     
  Gintis (1971) presents some interesting studies in support of his theory.  For 
instance he presents data showing that cognitive variables never account for more than 
30% of the variance in grade point average.  Gough (1951) finds that "overachiever" 
(students whose grades exceed that predicted by their IQ) consistently rewarded for 
being "dependable," "reliable," "honest," and "responsible". Studies of Smith (1976 a & 
b) show that discipline is independently rewarded through grades.  In predicting post-
high-school performance Smith finds that ethical variables such as "not a quitter," 
"responsible," "insistently orderly," "determined-preserving," - do three times better (in 
terms of R




verbal, SAT mathematical, and high school class rank.  And finally, there is significant 
evidence showing that such non-cognitive variables are also the main indicators of good 
job performance in the capitalist economy (see Bowles-Gintis p. 138-140).       
  There is also considerable evidence that in the past century and half at least, the 
community leaders in Britain and the United States have been similarly aware of the 
function of schools in preparing youth psychologically for work.  In England, Sunday 
schools were promoted by the Church of England in many villages in the 1970's and 
1800s.  Their function is uniformly described as being to kindle in the children of the 
poor "a spirit of industry and piety."  Sunday school teachers at Caistor were instructed  
 
    to tame the ferocity of their unsubdued passions [of children]  - to 
repress the excessive rudeness of their manners - to chasten the 
disgusting and demoralizing obscenity of their language - to 
subdue the stubborn rebellion of their wills - to render them 
honest, obedient, courteous, industrious, submissive, and 
orderly.
12 
       (Russell,  1960:5,  7)   
Andrew Ure the nineteenth century fervent supporter of industrialization, in praise of 
such schools wrote: 
 
    The unrivalled growth of the factory establishment of  Stockport . 
. . may be fairly ascribed, in no small measure, to the intelligence 
and probity of the recent race of operatives trained up in the 
nurture of its Sunday schools. 
       (Ure  1835:412) 
Johnson (1970) argues that in the Victorian period in England those who determined the 
elementary school curriculum also determined the 'patters of thought, sentiment and 
behavior of the working classes'.  Elementary schools were regarded as successful in the 
eyes of the dominant groups in society if the pupils emerged 'respectful, cheerful, hard-
working, loyal, pacific and religious'.
13 Stannard (1990) argues that public elementary 
                                                 
     12 R. C. Russell, History of Elementary Schools and Adult Education in Nettelton and Caistor 
(Caistor, 1960) p 5, 7.  
     13 R. Johnson, "Educational policy and social control in early Victorian England", Past and 




school in the mid-Victorian period in England played a crucial role in disseminating, 
and securing the acceptance of, bourgeois values. Education was seen, he argues, as a 
means of persuading the working class that its real interests lay in the perpetuation of 
the capitalist system.  With the victory of the middle-class and the dominance of the 
bourgeois values the concern for social order diminished and a broader view of the 
scope of elementary education emerged.  Nevertheless the essential social role of the 
school remained the teaching of the principles of industry and moral integrity. 
  Bowles and Gintis (1976) have collected extensive evidence of such view some 
of which I would like to present here.  In a statement signed by 77 college presidents 
and city and state schools superintendents published by the U.S. government in 1874 the 
function of schooling was defined as the following: 
   
    In order to compensate for lack of family nurture, the school is 
obliged to lay more stress upon discipline and to make far more 
prominent the moral phase of education.  It is obliged to train the 
pupil into habits of prompt obedience to his teachers and the 
practice of self-control in various forms. 
      (c.f.  Bowles-Gintis  1976:38) 
In the mid 18th century U.S it was commonly believed that an educated worker is a 
better worker.  In 1841, Homer Bartlett, agent of the Massachusetts Cotton Mills wrote: 
   
  From  my  observations  and  experience, I am perfectly satisfied 
that the owners of manufacturing property have a deep pecuniary 
interest in the education and morals of their help . . . I believe it 
will be seen that the establishment, other things being equal, 
which has the best educated and most moral help will give the 
greatest production at the least cost per pound.  





5.2   Empirical Findings 
The empirical studies analyzing the effect of education on growth have typically used 
school enrollment as a measure of human capital (meaning skill levels) in the 
individuals. In a cross-sectional study, Barro (1989) analyzes at the relationship 
between GNP growth rate and the initial levels of physical and human capital stocks.  
He employs the growth rate of real per capita GNP over the 1960 and 1985 period as the 
dependent variable and the 1960 levels of GNP per capita as a proxy for the initial 
physical capital stock, and the 1960 school enrollment rates at the elementary and 
secondary levels as a proxy for the initial level human capital stock. Barro shows that 
growth has a strong and negative correlation with the initial GDP per capita and a strong 
and positive correlation with human capital.  These findings are consistent with our 
Weberian model where the ratio of effective labor and physical capital per head (i.e., 
eh/k) is fixed in the balanced growth path. With effort exertion fixed at its optimal level 
the fixity of human-physical capital ratio implies that growth rate is negatively 
correlated with higher than average physical capital and positively correlated with 
higher than average human capital. 
  In a similar study Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990), thereafter MRW, show that 
an augmented Solow model which includes the accumulation of human as well as 
physical capital provide an excellent description of the cross country data.  MRW use 
the log of difference GDP per working-age person 1960-85 as the dependent variable, 
the log of the investment, population and schooling for the 1960-1985 period and the 
log of GDP in 1960 as the explanatory variables.  Schooling here is defined as the 
average percentage of the working-age population in the secondary school for the period 
1960-1985.  MRW show a strong positive correlation between income growth and the 
growth rates of physical and human capital accumulations, which again is totally 
consistent with our Weberian model.  I use time-series cross-section data on real GDP, 




higher education, in 30 countries and for the period covering from 1950 to 1988.  The 
data on education comes from the UNESCO publications and that of GDP and 
investment come from Summers and Heston (1988).  The criterion used for the 
selection of countries in the sample are the availability and the quality of data, 
particularly that of the educational data.  The oil-exporting and the politically disrupted 
economies are excluded from the data set. 
  Despite all the efforts, the quality of educational data is still far from being 
satisfactory.  The total years of schooling and the split between the elementary and 
secondary education are typically different for different countries.  Elementary 
education, for example, is defined as eight years of schooling and some others as four 
years.  What makes it worse is that the number of schooling years considered for the 
elementary or the secondary education changes for some countries. One often observes 
an abrupt change in the number of students enrolled in a country for a certain level of 
education. By means of linear interpolation I tried to keep the definition of the 
elementary and secondary education consistent in each country. And then there is the 
problem of missing data.  The educational data the 1950-1960 period is scattered for 
most countries. Since our time series data on education is already very short and 
education takes some years to have an effect on income, I did not discard the 1950-60 
data on education. Instead, I used linear extrapolation for making up for the missing 
data. 
  I have three more years of observation on real GDP (1950-88) than for the 
student enrolment figures (1950-85).  Since investments in the human and physical 
capital are likely to take more than three years to be effective, I did not truncate my 
GDP data set and instead used an at least three year lag in the explanatory variables.  
Table 1 shows the regressions for real GDP levels.  The explanatory variables are the 
number of students enrolled in the elementary L1t-15, secondary L2t-8 and higher 




lagged as indicated.  A Generalized Least Squares procedure was applied in the 
estimation of the model.  The model was assumed to be cross-sectionally homoskedastic 
and Time-wise Autoregressive.  I used an AR(1) process to find an estimate of the 
correlation coefficient for each of the cross sections separately.  This procedure is 
described by Kmenta [1986, Eq. 12.26].   
  The R-square between the observed and predicted values are all in excess of .99 
and hence not informative.  When the error terms are serially correlated the 
interpretation of the standard R-square becomes difficult.  Instead, I have reported the 
Buse R-square, which is a measure of the proportion of "weighted variation" in the 
dependent variable explained by the regression [see Buse (1973) and Judge et. al. 
(1985), p. 32, Eq. 2.3.16].  The standard errors are given in the parenthesis. Runs were 
made for all countries in the sample and for sub-samples of the LDC's and DC's 
(regressions 1, 2 and 3 respectively).  Table 1 shows the estimated coefficients for 
investment and the three levels of education are all positive and highly significant in all 
the three runs.  The sum of the coefficients is generally less than one.  The coefficient of 
gross investment is about 1/3 and that of the sum of the educational variables is less 
than 2/3.  Realizing that the contribution of the uneducated labor force is missing from 
the equation, one can conclude that the observed pattern of the estimated coefficients 
imply an underlying constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas production function in the 
sampled economies.    
  I tried a number of lag structure in the explanatory variables.  The particular lag 
structure given in Table 1 produced the highest t-ratios.  From this experiment I can tell 
that any lag structure within two years of the numbers given in Table 1, would produce 
similar results.  Looking at the coefficients in regression 2 and 3, it appears that the 
effectiveness of the secondary education is higher in the LDC's while that of higher 
education is higher in the DC's.  This is consistent with our Weberian theory and the 
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stronger effect in the DC's which is of course contrary to our expectations.  And 
investment seems to have about the same effect in both sub-samples.  However, because 
of the different correlation coefficients estimated in the two sub-samples, these results 
are not reliable.  In order to test for the significance of the difference of these 
coefficients a new regression was designed as the following: 
  
    
 
where y and x are the vectors of the dependent and independent variables and the 
subscript 1 and refer to variables in the LDC's and DC's respectively.  The (x1, x2)' 
makes up the vector of explanatory variables used in regression 1 and the (0, x2)' vector 
is a new set of explanatory variables whose coefficient, i.e., (β2-β1), indicates whether 
the explanatory variables in the two sub samples have differential effects on their 
respective dependent variables. A significant and negative value for β2-β1, for example, 
indicates that the explanatory variables in the first sub-sample x1, exert an stronger 
influence on their respective dependent variable y1 than the explanatory variables in the 
whole sample (x1, x2)' do on their dependent variables (y1, y2)'. In Table 1, L10, L20, 
L30, and I0 are the L1, L2, L3 and I analogues of (0, x2)'.  
  The results of this model are given in regression 4.  The estimated coefficients, 
by and large confirm our findings in regressions 2 and 3.  The negative coefficients for 
L20 and I0 indicate that the secondary education and investment are more effective in 
the LDC's and the positive coefficients for L10 and L30 indicate that the elementary 
education and higher education in the DC's are more effective than those in the LDC's.  
Aside from the secondary education where the difference of educational effectiveness 
i.e., L20 is statistically insignificant, it appears from regression 4, that education at all 




  Judging from the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables, the educational 
variables are highly correlated with each other. This correlation is particularly strong 
between the secondary and higher education. In the DC's these correlations are much 
higher and they extend to the investment levels as well. Despite the high correlations the 
level of significance are fairly high in Table 1. It must be realized that the figure for the 
elementary education L1, includes all those students that will undergo the secondary 
education L2, as well. Similarly the number of students that will go to higher education 
L3, are included in L2. In order to test for the effect of elementary education alone 
(people that receive elementary education but not higher), the elementary and secondary 
but not higher education, and the accumulative effects of all three of the educational 
levels the following explanatory variables were constructed. L1Nt is the number of 
students enrolled in the first level education net of those that will peruse secondary 
education or L1t-6-L2t, L2Nt is the number of students in the secondary education net of 
those that will pursue higher education levels or L2t-3-L3t.  The results of these runs are 
given in Table 2. The explanatory variables L1N0 and L2N0 in regression 30 are the 
analogous of L10 and L20 in Table 1. The negative coefficients of L1N0 and LN20 
indicate that the effect of the elementary and the secondary education net of higher 
levels of education are indeed higher in the LDC's. While the positive coefficient of L3 
indicates that the effectiveness of higher education maintains to be higher in the DC's. 
These results are fully consistent with out Weberian hypothesis. The level of 
significance in these coefficients, however, is not very high.  When L2N was dropped 
from the equation the results essentially remained the same.  But when L1N and L3 
were dropped out of the equation and L2N was retained the coefficient of L2N became 





6.  Summary  
The Weberian growth model developed here illustrates the possibility of economic 
growth with ethic-skill human capital. This model leads to a balanced growth path in 
which the economy grows at a constant rate and the level of effort exertion becomes a 
constant. One of the implications of our Weberian model is that the growth contribution 
of ethical education is higher in the LDC's.  To test for this hypothesis I presupposed the 
Bowles-Gintis hypothesis and used the elementary and secondary school enrollment 
rates as proxies for ethical education and the college enrollment rate as a proxy for 
cognitive skills in the labor force.  In our regression analysis we showed that the 
enrollment rates - all three of them - are important variables in explaining the variations 
in the GDP levels.  These variables explain more than 60 per cent of the variation in the 
GDP levels in the sample countries. We found that the growth contribution of college 
education is higher in the DC's while that of investment is higher in the LDC's.   
  These results are entirely consistent with our Weberian theory.  The comparison 
of the figures for the effectiveness of elementary and secondary schooling in the LDC's 
and DC's, however, does not conclusively confirm our expectations.  When the gross 
enrollment rates are used the effectiveness of education at all levels appears to be higher 
in the DC's and when the enrollment rates net of students perusing higher education is 
used the result is just the opposite.  
  Actually, it is not difficult to think of reasons why education in the LDC's is not 
as effective as one might expect. In teaching work ethics, the most effective method is 
perhaps, teaching by example. Here, the teacher himself should be the primary example 
of work ethics. To be effective he has to teach with passion and total conviction that 
honesty, hard work, differed gratification, and respect for the law and order are good 
virtues that ought to be held regardless of the outcome. In addition, he has to show by 
the way of reason and example that such virtues indeed bring prosperity, social respect 




and lawlessness none of these can be achieved easily.  As the number of the people with 
work ethics constitute a smaller and smaller fraction of the total population the task of 
teaching work ethics becomes exceedingly difficult. Faced with the stone wall of the 
disbelief and pessimism of the adult population and the scarcity of qualified instructors 
for training the young, the task of ethical education is monumental. Moreover, unless 
there are some objective grounds for its premises to hold, there is little hope that any 
significant number of people would learn and practice work ethics. 
  In some countries the habit formation function of schooling was understood 
from early on. The establishment of compulsory primary education during the Meiji 
period in Japan, for example, was accomplished with the clear intention of the state to 
"train the people so that each individual person may fully understand his duty as a 
Japanese subject, practice ethics and become qualified to enjoy welfare."
14  But it is far 
from clear that every nation that has compulsory educational system is seeking similar 
objectives.  Every nation naturally makes effort to pass on the set of ethical values that 
are cherished in that society.  These values, however, are not necessarily in accordance 
with or even consistent with the principals of productive efficiency. Under these 
circumstances more schooling might lead to an even stronger distaste for productive 
activities. The educated in South Asia, for example, tends to 'regard their education as a 
badge that relieves them of any obligation to soil their hands.'
15  Under this light the 
problem of the "educated unemployment" prevalent in a number of the LDC's can be 
better understood. 
                                                 
     14 Arinori Mori Japan's first Education Minister in the new system. See Makato Aso and Ikuo 
Amano (1972) Education and Japan's Modernization. p. 20.  




     B i b l i o g r a p h y  
Adam Smith 1776/1987. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 
Akerlof, A. George and Rachel E. Kranton 2003. “Identity and the Economic 
Organizations”, Working Paper. 
Akerlof, George A. 1970. "The Market for 'lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488-500. 
Arrow, Kenneth. 1974. "Gifts and Exchanges." Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. I, 
No. 4: 343-362. 
Bethell, Tom. 1983. "Libertarian Literacy: But Can Juanito Really Read?" National 
Review:1196-99  
Bowles Samuel and Gintis Herbert. 1976. Schooling in Capitalist America. Basic Books 
Inc., Publishers. 
Cass, D. 1965. "Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation." 
Review of Economic Studies, 78: 1138-1154. 
Cherrington. David j. 1980. The work ethic: working values and values that work. New 
York: AMACOM (1980) 
Clark, Gregory. 1987. "Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the 
Cotton Mills." Journal of Economic History, 47: 141-173. 
                 . 1987. "Productivity Growth without Technical Change in European 
Agriculture before 1850." Journal of Economic History, 41, No.2: 419-432. 
                 . 1991. "Textile History as World History", Working Paper, University of 
California at Davis. 





Congleton, Roger D. 1991. "The Economic Role of a Work Ethic." Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 15: 365-385. 
Esfahani, Hadi. 1991. "Reputation and Uncertainty: Toward an Explanation of Quality 
Problems in Competitive LDC Markets," Journal of Development Economics, 
January 1991, 35.1: 1-32. 
Furness, E. S. 1957. The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism. New 
York 
Gintis, Herber.1971. “Education, Technology, and the Characteristics of Worker 
Productivity,” American Economic Review 61, 2 (May, 1971):266-279. 
High, Jack. 1985. "State Education: Have Economists Made a Case?" Cato Journal 
5:305-23 
Huber M. Richard. 1971. The American Idea of Success. New York: McGraw-hill. 
Landes, David S. 1969. The Unbounded Prometheus: Technological Change and 
Industrial Development in West Europe from 1750 to the Present. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lott, John R. 1986 "Education, Democracy, and the Cost of Government Wealth 
Transfer." Working Paper. Hoover Institute, Stanford. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. "On the Mechanics of Economic Development." Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22:3-43. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review." Oxford 
Economic Papers 42:293-316 
Judge, George G. et. al. 1988. Introduction to the theory and practice of econometrics. 




Johnson, R. 1970. "Educational policy and social control in early Victorian England." Past 
and Present, 49: 96-119. 
King, Robert G., Plosser, Charles I. and Sergio Rebelo. 1988. "Production, Growth and 
Business Cycles." Journal of Monetary Economics, 21:195-232. 
Kmenta, Jan. 1986. Elements of Econometrics. New York: Academic Press.  
Koopmans, T. C. 1965. "On the Concept of Optimal Growth." in The Economic 
Approach to Development Planning, North Holland, Amsterdam. 1965. 
Maddison, Angus. 1982. Phases of Capitalistic Development. New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press. 
McClelland C. David. 1961. The achieving Society. Prinston. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil. 1992. A Contribution to the 
Empirics of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (May): 
407–37 
Marglin, Stephen. 1974. “What do Busses Do?” Review of Radical Political Economy, 
6.Summer. 
Moser, Cotton Textile Industry of the Far Eastern Countries 
Myrdal, Gunner. 1968. Asian Dream: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations. 
Ramsey, F. P. 1928. "Mathematical Theory of Saving." Economic Journal, 38: 543 59. 
Rebelo, Sergio. "Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth."  Journal of 
Political Economy 99, no. 3 (1991): 500–21  
Robinson H. M. 1959. Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism. Kelly & Millman, 
Inc. 
Romer, Paul M. 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth." Journal of Political 




Rodgers, T. Daniel. 1978. The Work Ethics in Industrial America, 1850-1920. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Russell R. C. 1960. History of Elementary Schools and Adult Education in Nettelton and 
Caistor. Caistor. 
Stannard, P. Kevin. 1990. "Ideology, education, and social structure: elementary 
schooling in mid-Victorian England."  History of Education, Vol. 19, No. 2:105-
122. 
Summers, Robert and Alan Heston, 1991, the Penn World Table (mark5): An expanded 
set of international comparisons, 1950-1988, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
106, 327-368. 
Thompson, E. P. 1963. “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism.” Past and 
Present, 38 December. 
Travers, Timothy. 1987. Samuel Smiles and the Victorian work Ethic. New York: Garland 
Ure, Andrew. 1847. The philosophy of manufactures, or, An exposition of the scientific, 
moral, and commercial economy of the factory system of Great 
Britain microform. London: C. Knight, 1835 (London : W. Clowes)  
Weber, Max. 1905 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by T. 
Parsons. Allen & Unwin, Winchester, MA. 
Weber, Max. 1927. General Economic History. Translated by Frank H. Knight, The 









Table 1: Dependent variable Log real GDP (1950-88) 
 
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
Number of 
countries      30    17 LDC's  13 DC's   30 
 
Constant   8.931   11.817   9.425   10.252 
   (.25)   (.426)   (.321)     (.261) 
 
ln(L1t-15)     .285     .282     .491     .38   
   (.018)   (.038)   (.031)   (.035) 
 
ln(L2t-8)     .108     .106     .045     .084   
   (.020)   (.026)   (.027)   (.026) 
 
ln(L3t-3)     .197     .147     .249     .134 
   (.016)   (.019)   (.021)   (.019) 
 
ln(It-3)       .357     .252     .231     .277   
   (.014)   (.018)   (.022)   (.017) 
 
ln(L10t-15)     ---      ---      ---     .124   
                                          (.049) 
 
ln(L20t-8)     ---        ---     ---    -.038   
         (.038) 
 
ln(L30t-3)     ---      ---     ---     .138   
                                        (.028) 
 
ln(I0t-3)     ---      ---     ---    -.10   




2      .90      .81     .97     .94 
 
DW      1.42   1.36   1.48   1.43 
 




                                                 
16 The assumed regression model is yit =xitβ+uit, where uit=ρiuit+εt and εt is a white 
noise. The estimated model is yit*=xit*β +εt, where yit*=yit–ρiyit, and xit*=xit-
ρixit. Here the correlation of determination (Buse R), the Durbin-Watson statistic, and the 
square root of estimated residual, all three are defined over the pooled residual of the 





Table 2: Dependent variable Log real GDP (1950-88) 
 
       (5)     (6)      (7)       (8) 
Number of 
Countries      30    17 LDC's  13 DC's    30 
 
Constant   8.543      9.451   9.39       7.929 
   (.205)   (.246)   (.339)     (.213) 
 
ln(L1Nt-15)     .04     .062     .055     .072   
   (.006)   (.015)   (.015)   (.017) 
 
ln(L2Nt-8)     .037     .059     .035     .021   
   (.011)   (.012)   (.015)   (.012) 
 
ln(L3Nt-3)     .246     .192     .216     .181 
   (.014)   (.016)   (.017)   (.016) 
 
ln(It-3)       .480     .418     .427     .527   
   (.015)   (.018)   (.017)   (.016) 
 
ln(L1N0t-15)     ---      ---      ---    -.035   
                                          (.019) 
 
ln(L2N0t-8)     ---      ---      ---    -.035   
         (.029) 
 
ln(L30t-3)     ---      ---      ---     .283   
                                        (.019) 
 
ln(I0t-3)     ---      ---      ---    -.057   
                                         (.013) 
 
Buse R
2      .92     .88     .87     .98 
 
DW      1.44   1.65   1.73   1.53 
 





Table 3: Dependent variable Log real GDP (1950-88) 
 
 
       (9)      (10)     (11)      (12) 
Number of 
Countries     30    17 LDC's  13 DC's   30 
 
Constant   7.758   9.479   5.176     7.661 
   (.209)   (.277)   (.361)     (.199) 
 
ln(L1Nt-15)     .066     .044     .011     .062 
   (.074)   (.016)   (.008)   (.019) 
 
ln(L3t-3)     .239     .217     .279     .200 
   (.014)   (.017)   (.023)   (.015) 
 
ln(It-3)      .532     .44       .687     .550   
   (.015)   (.014)   (.026)   (.016) 
 
ln(L10Nt-15)     ---      ---      ---    -.031   
                                          (.021) 
 
ln(L30t-3)     ---      ---     ---     .221   
                                        (.020) 
 
ln(I0t-3)     ---      ---     ---    -.062 
                                         (.011) 
 
Buse R
2      .94     .86     .94     .96 
 
DW      1.42   1.50   1.34   1.57 
 






Table 4: Definition of Variables in Tables 1-3 
 
L1it is the number of students enrolled in the elementary school (in country i & year t) 
L2it is the number of students enrolled in the secondary education 
L3it is the number of students enrolled in collage 
Iit is gross annual investment 
L10it is equal to D1i*L1it, where D1i=1 for DC's and 0 otherwise 
L20it is equal to D1*L2, where D1i=1 for LDC's and 0 otherwise 
L1Nit is the number of students enrolled in the elementary school net of those that will 
pursue secondary education or L1it-6-L2it,  
L2Nit is the number of students in the secondary education net of those that will pursue 
higher education levels or L2it-3-L3it.   




Less Developed Countries      Developed Countries 
1  INDIA       18  JAPAN 
2  PAKISTAN      19  ITALY 
3  KENYA      20  FINLAND 
4  EGYPT      21  WEST  GERM 
5  THAILAND      22  NETHERLANDS 
6  PHILIPPINES      23  FRANCE 
7  MOROCCO      24  NORWAY 
8  KOREA      25  BELGIUM 
9  BRAZIL      26  U.K. 
10  PORTUGAL      27  NEW  ZEALAND 
11  GREECE      28  AUSTRALIA 
12  TURKEY      29  CANADA 
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Consumer’s problem is to maximize 




    (1) 
subject to  
  k & = F[vk,ueh] - c – nk            (2) 
  h &  =  G[(1-v)k,(1-u)eh]  –  nh       (3) 
The optimal allocation of resources in this economy is achieved by choosing 





The necessary conditions follow by maximizing H with respect to the control 





Condition (A.i) can be written as 
           ( i . 1 )  
           ( i . 2 )  
           ( i . 3 )  
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Substituting for λ1 and λ2G2 in (i.4) from (i.3) and (i.2) we obtain: 
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From the first order condition (3.ii), we obtain the conditions for the growth of the 
shadow prices of the two goods and education: 
 
            
           ( i i . 1 )  
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Solve for λ2/λ1 in (ii.1) and substitute into (ii.1) to obtain:     
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Take the log and then time derivatives of (i.3) and substitute for λ λ /      2 &  from (5) to 
see:  
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  Now solve for λ1 and U1 from (i.2) and (i.3) respectively and substitute in (ii.2) 
to obtain:  
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where p=λ2/λ1. Assuming that k/eh, u and v, being constant in the balanced growth 
path we have: 
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Constancy of k/eh also implies that the shadow price of human capital in terms of 
final goods p=λ2/λ1 is a constant in the balanced growth path.  That is:  
 
 
It follows from (5) and (7) that:  
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Considering the following utility function 
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We can solve for the optimal level of effort exertion e in terms of the parameters of 
the model and human capital: 
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1-γ for the goods and the education sector respectively. Divide both 
sides of (A.3) by h, substitute (1-v)/(1-
 γ)G2 eh for G and substitute for e from 
(A.10) then we have: 
n   -  
- 1
u - 1
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h
h
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&
 (11) 
With constant effort exertion in the balanced growth path, the growth rates of 
physical and human capital are equal to g: 
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Growth rate of consumption is also a constant given by:  
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Growth rate of consumption falls with human capital. As h grows the second term in 
the brackets falls to zero and the large growth rate of consumptions approaches a 
constant.  Actually consumption has the same growth rate as that of capital goods.  
To see this take the capital accumulation constraint and divide it by k to obtain 
k &/k=vA(vk)
β-1(ueh)
1- β -c/k-n.  Solving for c/k and realizing that k &/k=g is a 
constant, we obtain the following expression; c/k=vF1/β-g-n, which is a constant 
also.  Therefore in the balanced growth path we have: 
 
]     -   F [
1
   =   
h
h
   =   
k
k
   =   
c
c
   =    g        1 ρ
σ
& & &
       ( 1 4 )  
Now let’s solve for F1 in terms of the constant level of effort exertion. In (A.12), 




Solving for (1-v)/(1-u) from the efficiency condition F2/F1 = G2/G1 and substituting 
in the above equation and rearrange terms we obtain: 
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 Where 0<Γ<1 and 0<ε<1.  From (A.14) and (A.12) solve for F1 
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From (16) and (17) solve for the optimal level of effort exertion:  
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